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Abstract 
The present paper addresses the case study of a financial institution, the Kendallville Bank, developed by The Anti-
Fraud Collaboration. The constituents of the Collaboration are the Center for Audit Quality, Financial Executives 
International, the National Association of Corporate Directors, and The Institute of Internal Auditors. These 
organisations are concerned with financial reporting fraud deterrence and detection. The case study approaches financial 
reporting fraud at a multidimensional level. It explores the corporate governance arrangements and management control 
instruments at place at the Kendallville Bank. The findings are discussed against the theoretical framework of the 
Agency Theory and the Stewardship Theory. Shortcomings of the arrangements are identified and safeguards are 
recommended on the background of international corporate governance best practice and academic literature. The risks 
arising from corporate governance weaknesses are addressed through various risk control procedures. Culture control is 
acknowledged as a major instrument to improve effectiveness and performance of the bank through a shift in the 
interpersonal interaction of the Board members, the executive team and the auditors.   
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Introduction 
 
Corporate governance can be defined as mechanisms by which an organisation is administered and supervised (ACCA, 
2012a, p.5). Where the owners of the company (the shareholders) do not participate in the day-to-day business of the 
company, as is the case in incorporated businesses like the Kendallville Bank (KB), these mechanisms deserve special 
consideration.  
 
At KB, the assessment of one of the key financial reporting figures, the Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses (ALLL), 
has been changed. The change results in increased net income, but only due to modification in calculation and not due 
to improved operations. This change occurs in a deteriorating economic climate which makes the increased net income 
appear misleading. The change was favoured by Dan Davis, Chief Lending Officer (CLO) and member of the executive 
team. Executive remuneration at KB partly depends on meeting financial and business targets. With Davis being 
responsible for loans and leases the arithmetical change of ALLL raises questions of his integrity, with integrity defined 
as honesty and transparency (Stanwick and Stanwick 2014, p.216).  
 
Thus, the first purpose of this report is to review the corporate governance structures and board of directors in place at 
KB and to make recommendations against international best practice. The second issue is to evaluate how the 
management control systems and the culture of KB may need to be changed. With KB currently pursuing acquisition of 
another bank, the issues raised in this report are crucial for the bank to remain a credible organisation for its own 
shareholders and that of a prospective acquiree.   
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Methods 
 
KB is a public company based in USA and thus is subject to the corporate governance provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) 2002 and the listing rules of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Besides this legislation and 
regulations, various corporate governance codes with relevance to the USA were used. These provisions are contrasted 
against the UK Combined Code and its preceding documents. The audit function is assessed using professional 
American and European codes of conduct for audit professionals. Academic literature was used to provide the 
theoretical context and to evaluate the practices at use. The list of references collects all the sources.   
 
 
 
Findings and Recommendations 
 
Review of the Executive Team  
 
The executive team at KB is led by Sandra Renwood who is president, CEO and chairman of the board of directors. 
This personal union is not precluded by the SOX regulations. But it is also not encouraged by American and 
international corporate governance principles. Even more, ICGN (2014, p.9) discourages that a former CEO becomes 
chairman after his executive term, let alone during the term. The UN (2006, p.12) claims that separation is considered 
desirable to prevent one person from incorporating too much power at the top of the organisation. CII (2015, p.6) asks 
to combine the roles in “very limited circumstances” only. Separation of duties is considered best practice acc. to the 
Combine Code (FRC 2014, p.7-8).  
 
One of the problems under the current system at KB is that no board meetings without the CEO can be conducted in 
order to evaluate her performance, as asked for by ICGN (2014, p.10). If that were the case the board probably could be 
more challenging in assessing the executives and their business conduct.  
 
Recommendations for the Executive Team 
 
The position of CEO and chairman should be separated. In case KB continues to combine these roles, an independent 
lead director should be deployed, as required by NACD (2008, p.8). He could determine the board agenda, inform the 
other directors and conduct meetings, all of which is currently made by Renwood. Also, KB should install an annual 
evaluation of whether the combination is still in the best interest of the company (BRT 2012, p.15). It could also 
introduce succession planning for the CEO (and other executives), as asked for by UN (2006, p.21) and BRT (2012, 
p.15). 
 
 
Review of the Board of Directors 
 
KB employs a board that consists of eleven non-executive directors. Their task is to monitor the executive team 
(G20/OECD 2015, p.45). The number of directors lies within a reasonable range, as for example CII (2015, p.7) 
proposes a number of directors between five and fifteen. The directors are elected to three-year terms, which is 
suggested by the Higgs Report (2003, p.53). The meetings are conducted on a monthly basis, which represents common 
practice (Souster 2012, p.6). The directors receive the meeting agenda 10 days in advance, which corresponds to the 
suggestion in the literature of at least 7 days (Bader 2005, p.5).  
 
Two directors currently serve on board of other financial service institutions. FRC (2011, p.6) asks for the directors to 
devote enough time to their board responsibilities. Serving on two boards seems reasonable, as research considers three 
to four directorships to be still appropriate (Bar-Hava et al. 2013, p.27).  To monitor the executives, directors have to be 
independent, otherwise their accountability towards the shareholders of KB may be compromised (NACD 2008, p.7). 
Independence prevents impairing relationships like business (BRT 2012, p.14) and banking (NYSE 2016, 
Sec.303A.02). Independence may be affected at KB. Most of the directors are still customers of KB. This may 
constitute a self-interest threat (UN 2006, p.13), as it may prevent them from making decisions to their own detriment, 
but which are favourable to the company.  
 
The directors are primarily entrepreneurs from KB’s area of operations, thus representing experience and knowledge 
suitable for banking purposes of KB (BRT 2012, p.13). However, it is questionable, whether owners of local businesses 
can discharge their duties as directors of KB given the complexity of a publicly listed bank (BRT 2012, p.13). Instead of 
provide training opportunities, Redwood considers suggesting to those directors who are poorly prepared for board 
meetings to resign after their term. With the two directors serving at other financial service organisations, the former 
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president of the insurance company and the former senior executive of a listed company, Renwood can dominate the 
board due to their combined financial proficiency. Such a domination by a group of individuals is alerted by FRC 
(2014, p.10). Corporate governance best practice calls for at least three committees to support the functioning of the 
board of directors: the nomination committee, the remuneration committee and the audit committee (G20/OECD 2015, 
p.48-49). A nomination committee at KB is not mentioned. Renwood considers suggesting to the poor performing 
directors to resign. In case she evaluates the directors and decides about their board membership on her own, this would 
contradict best practice as established by ICGN (2014, p.12) and FRC (2014, p.11).  
 
The same is true for the remuneration committee. Renwood reviews the performance of executives on her own, subject 
to a “structured performance review process”. A sophisticated process does not make the remuneration committee 
unnecessary. Singh, the chairman of the audit committee, is a CPA and thus qualified as financial expert acc. to SOX 
2002 Sec.407. However, he retired 10 years ago from public practice. This challenges whether his expertise can be 
regarded as “recent” acc. to FRC (2014, p.17). Another member of the audit committee regularly receives business 
loans from KB. FEE (2003a, p.7) questions the independence of audit committee members if they were to receive 
benefits from the company other than ordinary remuneration. 
 
Recommendations for the Board of Directors 
 
Although the three-year term of the directors is acceptable, no information is provided on the maximum number of 
terms a director can serve. FRC (2014, p.11) considers that a term of more than nine years jeopardises independence, 
with any term of more than six years calling for thorough review of the board composition. KB should therefore refresh 
its board at least every six years. Regarding the independence of the directors, who are customers of the bank, KB 
should investigate whether these relations are immaterial for both the directors and the bank (NYSE 2016, Sec.303A.02; 
FRC 2014, p.10). The relationships may be material for “small to mid-sized business owners” comprising the board. If 
material, the relations should be cancelled or the directors replaced by others. Otherwise KB would violate NYSE 
(2016, Sec.303A.01) and UN (2006, p.13) provisions, which call for the majority of board directors to be independent, 
if chairman and CEO are not separated. The lack of specialist proficiency among directors can be mitigated through 
training, which is encouraged by G20/OECD (2015, p.53) and FRC (2014, p.11). Although Redwood enables 
discussion, as required by G20/OECD (2015, p.53), the board meetings are rather chatting. KB board meetings should 
strive for constructive scrutiny as mentioned by NACD (2008, p.7). The bank should install a nomination committee to 
ensure proper board succession planning and director evaluation considering shareholder interests as called for by CII 
(2015, p.7). KB also needs a remuneration committee to determine payment of the executive team, as required by 
corporate governance codes like ICGN (2014, p.16) and FRC (2014, p.11). Regarding the audit committee, KB should 
try to replace Rob Singh with a financial expert having a more recent expertise. Also, KB should investigate whether 
the funds borrowed by the committee member were granted “in the ordinary course of business and on arm’s length 
basis” and are immaterial (ACCA 2012b, p.72). Otherwise the member should be persuaded to resign from the 
committee or to stop borrowing from KB.   
 
 
Review of the Internal Audit 
 
Internal audit is considered a major instrument of the board of directors to ensure proper corporate governance (COSO 
2013, p.4). The internal audit function is led by Janet Lee who is a CPA and thus a professional, as recommended by 
FEE (2003b, p.11). However, contrary to FEE (2003, p.50) and FRC (2014, p.17), the function reports to Kmetko, CFO 
instead of the audit committee. The audit plan is developed on annual basis which is in compliance with IIA (2012, p.9). 
It focuses on operational efficiency and weaknesses in loan underwriting, which is due to Kmetko’s participation in 
design and development of the audit plan. This involvement of CFO and the reporting line to CFO compromises the 
oversight and scrutiny that are at heart of internal audit (G20/OECD 2015, p.49). Janet Lee is also unable to assert the 
need for training regarding the new ALLL approach. This hampers her professional due care (IIA 2012, p.6).  
 
Recommendations for the Internal Audit 
 
The function should report to the audit committee and retrieve its role as “authority in an entity” (COSO 2013, p.4) to 
ensure oversight over the executive team instead of being subordinate to the needs of CFO. The responsibility for the 
development of the audit plan should lie with head of function Janet Lee (IIA 2012, p.9). Further, the plan should be 
more risk-related (FEE 2003, p.52). Janet Lee tried to discuss the new ALLL with Kmetko from the viewpoint of 
operating effectiveness.  Her inquiry would have carried more weight if made in view of the risks.   
 
 
 
International Journal of Applied Economic Studies                              Vol. 4, Issue 2 April 2016 
 17 
Review of the External Audit 
  
External audit of financial statements provides shareholders with assurance that the statements give a true and fair view 
of the company and were prepared by management in accordance with reporting and legal standards (ACCA 2012b, 
p.352). Close liaison of external auditors with the audit committee and thus with the board of directors is encouraged 
(ACCA 2012b, p.45). KB is audited by PLN with Pat LaSalle being leading audit partner for four years. LaSalle 
maintains friendly relations with members of the executive team. This constitutes a familiarity threat, compromising 
LaSalle’s independence. AICPA (2015, p.28) argues that an auditor can become sensitive to the client’s needs if the 
auditor’s “close friends” are employed by the client. Furthermore, with Jennifer Watkins as the engagement team senior 
manager and LaSalle’s direct report PLN employs an auditor with limited competence on banking clients. This does not 
impose a threat under AICPA (2015, p.106) as long as there is another knowledgeable team member. Although LaSalle 
initially intended to support Watkins, she had to focus on another engagement with a new client, resulting in a poor 
audit at KB.  
 
Recommendations for the External Audit 
 
PLN will have replace LaSalle the next year. No listed company is allowed to be audited by an accounting firm if the 
audit has been performed by the same audit partner for five years acc. to SOX 2002 Sec.203. PLN has to install 
safeguards against the familiarity threat like a quality control review of the work performed by LaSalle. It could also 
discuss this issue with the audit committee (ACCA 2012b, p.61). PLN could also replace LaSalle by another lead 
partner without ties to the executives, but with enough expertise and time to support the audit team, because LaSalle is 
too preoccupied with further engagements.   
 
 
 
 
Discussion of the Corporate Governance at Kendallville Bank 
 
The agency theory argues that the agents (the management) can pursue their own interests to the detriment of their 
principals (the shareholders) (Solomon and Solomon 2004, p.17). This can happen in case of adverse selection and 
information asymmetry. Adverse selection occurs if the agent chosen is deviant from what is required by the principal 
(Eisenhardt 1989, p.60). Information asymmetry follows from the agents’ information advantage over the principal 
given the agent’s involvement in day-to-day operations (Shapiro 2005, p.264). This is intensified if the agent is subject 
to moral hazard – if he is able to hide his action from the principal (Caillaud and Hermalin 2000, p.2).  
 
It cannot be argued that Davis has been deviant from the outset. Instead, KB have benefitted from his managerial skills 
for years. But when pushing for the change of ALLL he prepared memos for approval by the loan review officer and 
Kmetko which either did not mention the change at all (2nd meeting) or contained only short explanations (3rd meeting). 
All the details were included in the exhibit of which his was aware that in will not be examined neither by the loan 
review officer, nor by Kmetko. During the external audit stage he delayed to deliver ALLL documentary and to answer 
auditor’s questions, so that the audit was completed without scrutinising ALLL. These techniques point toward 
information asymmetry deployed by Davis and his ability to hide his knowledge.  
 
Research suggests that the board of directors is one of the instruments suitable to monitor the management to counteract 
such problems (Hill and Jones 1992, p.132). “Check-the-box” mentality (CCG 2010, p.26) prevails during board and 
committee meetings at KB, at which the executives’ recommendations are usually accepted. Explanations provided by 
Davis are even perceived to be educational by the board members. Employees performing crucial supervisory tasks like 
internal audit cannot challenge the predominance of executives, too. Under the agency theory the mechanisms of 
corporate governance at KB can be considered ineffective. 
 
The stewardship theory considers managers as stewards who align their interest with that of their principals (Arthurs 
and Busenutz, 2003, p.9). Under this assumption, the board of directors empowers the management rather than monitors 
it (Muth and Donaldson 1998, p.6). The executive team enjoys working for KB. Renwood ensures that organisational 
objectives like growth, profitability and shareholder return are pursued. This behaviour of executives corresponds to the 
assumptions of the stewardship theory (Madison 2014, p.15). However, boards may be blinded by the admiration for 
their executives (Choo and Tan 2007, p.205), as is the case with Davis. His winning personality and his perceived 
professional infallibility make the board and even the other executives accept his propositions. Therefore, the 
stewardship theory fails to address executive misconduct because it places an undue reliance on their integrity.  
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Discussion of Management Control and Culture at Kendallville Bank 
 
Businesses operate under risky conditions (Sax 2015, p.10). In order to nevertheless achieve its objectives, businesses 
have to implement management control processes by which management can make employees pursue its goals (Berry 
et. al. 2005, p.18). One of such business risks is the change risk. It occurs when change is to be implemented and can 
materialise if the change is complex and affects performance (Roberts et al. 2003, p.24). The change in ALLL can 
constitute change risk. In the following Davis’ behaviour will be evaluated to show in which different ways risk can be 
addressed. Results controls are implemented to achieve target goals (Reeves and Woodward 1970, p.38). This can lead 
to behavioural displacement, inducing behaviour that was not intended by the organisation (Wilson and Gilligan 2005, 
p.753). The manipulation of ALLL performed by Davis shows that the desirable net income increase can be achieved 
by dubious means.  
 
Action controls require close supervision of the tasks performed (Ho et al. 2011, p.80). They are rather suitable for 
repetitive tasks with a low degree of personal initiative, than for a finance executive officer. Furthermore, they can be 
bypassed through gamesmanship with the perpetrator “outgaming” the system, for example via accounting 
manipulation as done by Davis, to make his action appear in line with the requirements (Brand 2013, p.73). Personal 
controls focus on the employee’s ability to align his personal goals with that of the organisation. This can be enhanced 
through training, resources and influence distribution towards the employee (Sands 2006, p.144). Davis as a highly 
skilled and empowered manager could not be prevented from manipulating ALLL, rendering personal controls 
ineffective.  
 
Cultural controls aim at monitoring employees through social interaction with others in the organisation (Sorsanen 
2009, p.12). Such an influence can be exercised through a strongly promoted adherence to the corporate code of 
conduct and the “tone at the top” (Higgoda 2012, p.11). The strong position of the executive team at KB makes the 
management the gravitation point of the bank. Although a colleague-friendly attitude is maintained there is a clear 
“chair of command”. Although KB complies with SOX 2002, its code of conduct is rather a lip service as it only 
requires employees to certify to have read and followed the code. There is neither an ethics committee at KB (UN 2006, 
p.17), nor a promotion of the whistleblower hotline among employees. This constitutes a non-collectivist, high power 
distance culture with controls being regarded as inferior (Madison 2014, p.12).  
 
In order to prevent further misconduct through the implementation of cultural controls, the culture at KB as described 
above has first to change. Emphasis must be placed on corporate governance control instruments. Also, strong 
commitment to corporate governance values at the top of the organisation is necessary to fill the new environment with 
life. After this shift in culture KB will be better equipped to face business risks. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This report reveals several drawbacks at the corporate governance structure of KB. These weaknesses hinder proper 
control of the executive team placing an undue reliance on the integrity of its constituents. This makes KB vulnerable 
for failure should the executives transgress. Following improvements to KB’s corporate governance structure are 
suggested to ensure supervision of the executive team: 
 
- separation of chairman and CEO duties at the top 
- election of an independent chair to lead the board of directors 
- skilled enhancement programmes for the directors 
- committee staffing with independent and skilled directors 
- introduction the nomination, remuneration and ethics committees  
- division of responsibilities between management and oversight function 
- regular evaluation of directors and executives by the board 
- enforcement and promotion of the code of conduct 
- introduction and oversight of safeguards for the external audit 
- awareness enhancement of whistleblower system in place and whistleblower protection 
 
Besides these reforms KB should strengthen its management control through the implementation of culture controls. 
Culture controls appear most suitable to address risks imposed by the executives. The successful implementation of 
these controls make a shift in culture at KB necessary: away from a high power distance culture with few formal 
controls towards an environment in which management oversight is welcomed to the benefit of the corporation. 
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